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Abstract
In the information overload regime, human communication tasks such as responding to email are
well-modeled as priority queues, where priority is determined by a mix of intrinsic motivation and
extrinsic motivation corresponding to the task’s importance to the sender. We view priority queuing
from a principal-agent perspective, and characterize the effect of priority-misalignment and information
asymmetry between task senders and task receivers in both single-agent and multi-agent settings. In
the single-agent setting, we find that discipline can override misalignment. Although variation in human
interests leads to performance loss in the single-agent setting, the same variability is useful to the principal
with optimal routing of tasks, if the principal has suitable information about agents’ priorities. Our
approach starts to quantitatively address the effect of human dynamics in routine communication tasks.
Index Terms
Information overload, principal-agent problem, queuing
I. INTRODUCTION
Many emerging informational technologies such as social media and collaborative productivity plat-
forms are built on top of near-optimal technical solutions to reliable information flow [2], but there is little
understanding of information-theoretic limits or optimal designs of these engineering systems themselves.
This is because such systems are not purely technical but sociotechnical in scope, where humans cannot
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1be abstracted away [3]. To optimally design such systems, we may need a perspective that not only
merges information-theoretic and network-oriented approaches [4], [5], but also takes certain aspects of
human behavior into account [6].
In the accompaniment to Shannon’s seminal work, Warren Weaver talks about different levels of
communication, culminating with the so-called effectiveness problem [7]: how effectively does the re-
ceived meaning affect conduct in the desired way? In sociotechnical information systems, solving the
effectiveness problem in human response to received information is key.
Indeed the effectiveness of communication is strongly governed by limited human attention [8], as
well as intrinsic and extrinsic motivating factors [9]. Our present work takes nascent steps to develop a
mathematical understanding of sociotechnical communication, considering a principal-agent formulation
of a human priority queue.1
Since there is a limit to the rate at which humans can work [8], tasks such as responding to emails
queue up, especially in the information overload regime [11]. Also, humans generally do not perform
their tasks in the order in which they are received, but act on them based on certain priorities [12].
Indeed, studies have shown that human communication dynamics, such as email correspondence, follow
heavy-tailed timing distributions, which is in contrast to traditional queuing models that assume Poisson
statistics, and suggests that patterns of deliberate human activity are at work. A prominent explanation
for this empirical phenomenon is a priority queue model of human action [13].
What factors determine priorities? The information gap theory of curiosity [14] has often been demon-
strated: people read an email if the subject line suggests it is probably communicative in Shannon’s sense
of having uncertainty [15], [16], cf. [17]. As mentioned in [16], factors other than message importance
(such as social considerations) also play a role in the way people respond to emails. More generally,
both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations contribute to the eagerness and speed with which people engage
in their tasks [9], [18], [19]. Intrinsic factors push people to act due to interest and satisfaction from the
activity itself. Extrinsic factors, on the other hand, involve people drawing motivation from the extrinsic
consequences of completing the task.
Consider, for instance, how an employee of an organization typically acts upon assigned tasks. Al-
though the arriving tasks have various levels of importance for the organization, the employee’s level
1One might wonder whether human behavior is consistent enough to justify analysis through (stochastic) mathematical models,
the way physical communication channels and information sources seem to be. We believe this is justified, as many long-standing
results from psychology are consistent and dependable, displaying test-retest reliability, inter-rater reliability, parallel-forms
reliability, and internal consistency reliability [10].
2of interest in each task also plays a significant role in his prioritization. Therefore, there is a possible
misalignment between the priorities of the organization and those of the employee. Further, there is
usually an information asymmetry between the task sender and the employee—the sender may not be
aware of the intrinsic motivation that affects the priorities of the employee towards the assigned tasks.
A. Queuing-theoretic principal-agent communication
We look at the human priority queue as a principal-agent problem [20], concerning ourselves with
the impact on the principal (task sender) of decisions made by the agent (task receiver). The principal-
agent problem occurs due to misalignment of interests and information asymmetry between the parties
in decision problems.
Translating this to the effectiveness problem, the transmitter is the principal who assigns jobs to the
agent. The principal wants her agent to perform tasks in a particular priority order, which are driven by
her interests. Under the information overload regime, the agent has many tasks to perform, and hence his
tasks queue up. In addition, the agent has different levels of interest in the queued tasks, which may be
different from the principal’s interests. Though aware of the principal’s interests, the agent prioritizes the
tasks according to some function of his intrinsic and extrinsic motivation factors. Further, the principal
does not have precise knowledge of the agent’s interests. This information asymmetry and conflict of
interests gives rise to the queuing-theoretic principal-agent communication problem we study.
In this paper, we use a priority queuing framework to study two related problems, namely (i) task
execution by people, and (ii) task distribution in hierarchical human organizations involving several
subordinate agents. We aim to quantify the impact of information asymmetry, of interest-misalignment,
and of diversity of human motivations in such systems.
Note that strategic communication has been studied in economic theory [21]–[24], but without key
engineering considerations such as queuing. These papers take a fairly simplified game-theoretic perspec-
tive, and when principal-agent issues arise, they are primarily concerned with contract design and the
imposition of interpersonal authority within organizations. On the other hand, we take a priority queuing
approach, and are specifically interested in real-valued engineering performance criteria such as delay
and throughput. Further note that studies in mass communication are rarely quantitative [25].
At the heart of our work lies the fact that limited human attention and factors of prioritization lead
to novel mathematical problems not encountered previously in communication network design [26]. Our
study suggests that queuing theory, which plays a crucial role in the design and analysis of communication
networks [27], is also a useful tool in characterizing sociotechnical information flow.
3To characterize the performance of the priority queue from the principal’s perspective, we define a
cost function as the average priority-weighted sojourn time of the queue. The sojourn time is the number
of time steps from when a task enters the queue to the time it leaves. A large cost implies a large delay
for high-priority tasks, which is undesirable for the principal.
We develop expressions for the cost function for various scenarios. We start with the analysis of
a principal-agent problem with one agent. Under this setting, we first look at variation in agent’s
priorities due to extrinsic motivation and conflict of interests between principal and agent: we focus
on understanding the effect of the alignment between the principal’s and the agent’s interests, as well as
the effect of extrinsic motivation on the agent’s prioritization. Second, we compare an agent working at
variable rate—the variation being a function of the agent’s interest—with one working at a constant rate.
While we find that a variable agent performs worse than a constant agent in the single-agent case, we
find a contrary result when extended to the multi-agent case under certain circumstances. In the multi-
agent case, we explore the effect of information asymmetry and seek to find optimal routing policies that
minimize the cost for all tasks. We extend that objective to find routing policies that minimize the cost
for a given subset of tasks.
The insights resulting from these models form important building blocks for designing information
flow in sociotechnical systems. For concreteness and tractability, we use specific statistical assumptions
(Gaussian distributed priorities, etc.), but the general modeling principles and insights should hold more
broadly. Even in these simplified settings, we get some non-intuitive and surprising mathematical results.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION
We model agents as discrete-time preemptive resume priority queues. Time is slotted, with service
initiation at slot boundaries. The scheduling discipline is preemptive resume: a newly arriving task can
interrupt the ongoing service of a task, and the interrupted task can resume service when the former has
finished. In our case, preemption is based on task priority, i.e., a newly arriving task can interrupt the
ongoing service of a task if the former has a higher priority than the latter. Arrivals in different time slots
are i.i.d., with arrival and service processes independent of each other. To ensure stability, the average
number of tasks arriving in the system is strictly less than the average service rate.
Let random variable X denote the principal’s interests, and let random variable D denote the sojourn
time of a task in the queue. The sojourn time of a task is the time from when the task enters the queue
to when it leaves. The cost measures performance and is the average priority-weighted sojourn time of
the queue, E[XD]. We initially assume a general distribution for arrival and service processes, but then
4look at particular distributions as examples.
For the single-agent case, let random variable Y denote the agent’s interests. Let A(k) denote the
number of tasks arriving in the queue in the kth time step and let Az(k) denote the number of tasks
arriving in the queue in the kth time step with priorities higher than z. Let S denote the service time of
a task. Let λ be the arrival rate of the tasks in the queue. When the service rate is the same for all tasks,
we call it µ, where µ = 1/E[S]. When the service rate is variable, it is a function of the agent’s interest
in the task, Y . The cost for the single-agent case is denoted Co.
For the multi-agent case with two agents, let random variables Y1 and Y2 denote their interests. Let
S1 and S2 denote the service times of a task in the two queues. We consider memoryless task allocation
functions that depend on one or more parameters of the same task only, and not on parameters of other
tasks. Let λ1 and λ2 be the arrival rates of the tasks in the queues, and let λ = λ1 +λ2 be the total arrival
rate. When the service rate is the same for all tasks, we assume service rates µ1 and µ2, µi = 1/E[Si].
For variable service rate, the service rate of a task is governed by that agent’s interest in the task. We
denote the cost for the multi-agent case by Cm.
III. SINGLE-AGENT PRINCIPAL-AGENT COMMUNICATION
Consider a single-agent principal-agent communication model, where the principal has one agent to
allocate tasks to. Each task has two kinds of priorities, X and Y . The X term is the importance of a task
to the principal whereas the Y term captures how interesting the task is to the agent. The principal would
want the agent to prioritize tasks according to X . The agent is aware of X , but since he has his own set
of interests Y , he uses a function of both X and Y to prioritize the tasks. The correlation between X
and Y indicates how aligned the principal and agent are. We analyze two variations of the model:
• Priority variation with agent’s interests: The agent serves each task at the same rate, but prioritizes
the tasks as a function of the principal’s and his own interests. Here, we are interested in analyzing
the effect of interest misalignment and intrinsic motivation on the cost function. For the sake of
concreteness and tractability, we model X and Y as jointly Gaussian random variables.
• Service rate variation with agent’s interests: The agent prioritizes the tasks according to the principal’s
interests, but serves each task at a different rate based on his own interest in the task. Here, we are
interested in analyzing the effect of the agent’s service rate on the cost function. In this case, we
model X and Y as uniformly distributed.
5A. Priority variation
Each task is served at the same rate. For concreteness, we consider X and Y as jointly Gaussian random
variables with correlation coefficient ρ (which completely captures the alignment between principal and
agent). A task can have any real number as its priority: the lower the priority, the more negative its value.
The agent prioritizes according to random variable Z, which is a linear function of X and Y :
Z = g(X,Y ).
A task with larger Z is served first.
Recall the cost Co is the average priority-weighted sojourn time Co = E[XD], where D is the sojourn
time of a task in the queue. Note that the cost takes X but not Y into account, reflecting the fact the
principal’s cost is governed only by X . Also note that the principal would want the cost of the agent
queue to be as small as possible. A well-aligned agent will have negative cost for its queue, since lower
priority tasks (which have negative priorities) will have larger sojourn times. Using the law of iterated
expectations gives:
E[XD] = E [E[XD|Z]] . (1)
The sojourn time of a task is a function of Z, and thus depends on X through Z. However, D is
conditionally independent of X (conditioned on Z). This follows from applying the law of iterated
expectations to (1):
E [E[XD|Z]] = E [E [E[XD|Z,X]|Z]]
= E [E [XE[D|Z,X]|Z]] . (2)
The sojourn time of a task D is a random variable that is a function of the priority of that task in
the queue. This implies D is a function of X and Y only through Z. In other words, knowing Z, the
distribution of D does not change with knowledge of X:
P(D ≤ d|Z) = P(D ≤ d|Z,X).
Therefore,
E[D|Z] = E[D|Z,X].
Consequently, using (2):
E [E [XE[D | Z,X] | Z]] = E [E [XE[D | Z] | Z]] .
6As a result,
E[XD] = E [E [X | Z]E [D | Z]] . (3)
To find E[X|Z], we note that since X and Y are jointly Gaussian, X and Z will also be jointly
Gaussian. The conditional expectation of X can thus be obtained as
E[X|Z] = µx + ρx,z σx
σz
(Z − µz), (4)
where µx and µz are the respective means, σ2x and σ
2
z are the respective variances, and ρx,z is the
correlation coefficient. The value of E[X|Z] can be explicitly obtained from the statistics of X and Y ,
and the function g.
Next we derive an expression for E[D|Z]. Let us tag a task with Z = z. Since the scheduling discipline
is preemptive resume priority, this task’s sojourn time is affected only by the tasks whose priorities are
greater than z, and not the order in which they are executed. Hence, we can map our continuous priority
queue onto a two-class priority queue. The tagged task constitutes the low-priority class and all the higher
priority tasks constitute the high-priority class. We can now employ standard results from the priority
queueing literature. From [28], the expected sojourn time of a task with priority z is
E[D|Z = z] = (2µ− λz) var (Az(k))
2λz(µ− λz)2
+
λzµ
2var (S)
2(µ− λz)2
− λz
2 (µ− λz) , (5)
where λz is the average number of task arrivals in a time step with priorities higher than z, and var(Az(k))
and var(S) are the variances of the number of task arrivals in a time step with priorities higher than z
and of the execution times, respectively.
Let pz be the probability that an arriving task has a priority greater than z. To find E[D|Z = z],
we see that the variance values var(Az(k)) and var(S) can be obtained from the statistics of the arrival
and the service processes. Moreover, since λz is the fraction of the average number of tasks that have
priorities greater than z, we can write λz = pzλ. Hence, using (4) and (5) in (3), we obtain the following
expression for the cost function
Co =
∫
z
fZ (z) dz
(
µx + ρx,z
σx
σz
(z − µz)
)
(6)
×
(
(2µ− λz) var (Az(k))
2λz(µ− λz)2
+
λzµ
2var (S)
2(µ− λz)2
− λz
2 (µ− λz)
)
.
To gain insight into this expression, let us evaluate it for a concrete example.
71) Example: Let X and Y be zero-mean, jointly Gaussian random variables with correlation matrix
K =
1 ρ
ρ 1
 .
Here, ρ denotes the extent of alignment between the principal and agent. When ρ = 1, there is perfect
alignment between the principal’s interest X and the agent’s interest Y . When ρ = −1, there is perfect
misalignment. When ρ = 0, X and Y are independent. We take the random variable Z as
Z =
γX + (1− γ)Y√
γ2 + (1− γ)2 + 2ργ (1− γ)
, (7)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that indicates how much importance the agent gives to the principal’s
interests. Whereas ρ captures the intrinsic alignment of the agent with the principal, γ captures the
extrinsic motivation that aligns the agent with the principal. The denominator is the standard deviation of
γX + (1− γ)Y . Thus, Z is unconditionally a standard Gaussian random variable. Hence, (4) becomes
E[X|Z] = ρx,zZ, (8)
where ρx,z can be calculated as
ρx,z =
cov(X,Z)√
var(X)var(Z)
=
γ + ρ (1− γ)√
γ2 + (1− γ)2 + 2ργ (1− γ)
. (9)
For the specific case where the number of arrivals in a given time has a Poisson distribution and the
service times are geometrically distributed, we have
var (Az (k)) = λz and var (S) = 1−µµ2 .
As a result, (5) reduces to
E[D|Z = z] = 2µ− 2λzµ+ λ
2
z
2(µ− λz)2
. (10)
The probability that an arriving task has a priority greater than z is
pz =
∫ ∞
z
1√
2pi
exp
(−u2
2
)
du
= Q(z).
Thus, λz = λQ(z). Substituting this in (10) yields:
E[D|Z = z] = 2µ− 2µλQ(z) + λ
2Q2(z)
2(µ− λQ(z))2 . (11)
8Substituting (8) and (11) into (3), we get the cost function as
Co = ρx,z
∫ ∞
z=−∞
(
1√
2pi
exp
(
−z2
2
))(
z
2µ− 2µλQ(z) + λ2Q2(z)
2(µ− λQ (z))2
)
dz. (12)
The integral in (12) is the cost to the principal when the agent is perfectly aligned. For all values of
µ and λ (satisfying λ < µ), the integral gives a constant negative value. This is intuitively reasonable,
since the absolute values of high priorities and low priorities are the same and the sojourn times for high
priority tasks is smaller than the sojourn times for low priority tasks. The cost function is completely
characterized by ρx,z , up to a multiplicative constant.
2) Plotted Results: Continuing with the example, Fig. 1 plots cost as a function of γ for constant
values of ρ, whereas Fig. 2 plots cost as a function of ρ for constant values of γ. The plots are drawn
for µ = 0.6 and λ = 0.4. Some observations from the plots are as follows (the last one is surprising).
• For a constant ρ ∈ (−1, 1), cost is a monotonically decreasing function of γ (Fig. 1). This is
expected, since a higher weight given to the importance of tasks in prioritizing implies less delay
for more important tasks, which results in a smaller cost value.
• For ρ = 1, there is complete correlation between the agent’s and the principal’s interests (Fig. 1).
So γ does not have any effect on the service discipline and hence cost has the minimum value
for all γ. For ρ = −1, the agent’s and the principal’s interests are in complete negative correlation
(Y = −X). In this case, ρx,z becomes
ρx,z =
2γ − 1
|2γ − 1| .
So the cost function attains the maximum value for all γ ∈ [0, 0.5), and the minimum value for all
γ ∈ (0.5, 1], with a discontinuity at γ = 0.5. At γ = 0.5, the queue operates without priorities.
• For γ ∈ (0, 0.5), cost is a monotonically decreasing function of ρ (Fig. 2). This is intuitively
reasonable, since for a given γ if the agent’s interests are more aligned with the principal’s interests,
cost will decrease.
• The surprising result is seen in Fig. 2 for γ ∈ (0.5, 1). Here, the cost starts from the minimum value,
increases with ρ, attains a maximum, and then decreases to the same minimum value. This implies
it is better to have a completely misaligned agent rather than a slightly aligned agent, if the agent
gives more weight to the importance of the task: discipline can override lack of alignment.
This last observation can be explained as follows: when ρ = −1, X and Y completely determine each
other (misaligned). Thus Z is a completely deterministic function of X , and hence ρx,z = 1. With an
increase in the value of ρ, X and Y are not completely determined by each other; for a fixed value
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Fig. 1. Cost as a function of γ for constant values of ρ.
of X , Y can take any value from its support set with a non-zero probability. Thus, Z is no longer a
deterministic function of X . Hence, ρx,z decreases and consequently cost increases.
These results may help the principal decide how to be maximally effective under some constraints.
For example, the principal can offer some exogenous incentive to the agent so that the agent works in
her favor, and try to tradeoff between the incentive offered and the loss incurred. Later in this paper,
we extend this model to accommodate more than one agent and see how it improves the cost for the
principal.
Next we look at the setting where the agent prioritizes according to the importance of the tasks, but
performs certain tasks faster than others due to interest.
B. Service rate variation
Instead of prioritizing by Z, the agent now picks a task on the basis of its importance (a task with a
higher X will be executed first). This is a particular case of the previous model when γ = 1. But now
the rate at which a task is executed is an increasing function of the agent’s interest in it, i.e.
µ = µ(Y ).
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Fig. 2. Cost as a function of ρ for constant values of γ.
Thus, the agent’s priorities coincide exactly with those of the principal, but how fast the agent works
depends on his own interest in the task at hand.
The cost function is now
E[XD] = E [E[XD | X]) = E [XE[D | X]] . (13)
This boils down to finding the average sojourn time for a given task. In [29], the expression for E[D|X]
is obtained under the assumption that service rates of all tasks in one class are the same. In our model,
µ(y) is the service rate of a task with the agent’s interest value Y = y. Since X and Y are independent,
the service rate of a task with priority X = x is the unconditional service rate of the task, which is the
same for each task, given by
P (S = n) =
∫
P(S = n | Y = y)fY (y) dy . (14)
Thus we can use the expression for E[D|Z] as given in (5) (with Z replaced by X). Substituting this
expression in (13), the cost function is
Co =
∫
x
xfX(x)dx
(
(2µ− λx) var (Ax(k))
2λx(µ− λx)2
+
λxµ
2var(S)
2(µ− λx)2
− λx
2 (µ− λx)
)
. (15)
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Let µ̂ be the unconditional service rate and v̂ar(S) be the unconditional variance of the service time. Let
Ĉo be the cost for this case. Once again we look at an example to see the behavior of the cost function.
1) Example: Assume the arrival process is Poisson and the service time distribution is conditionally
geometric, i.e.
P(S = n | Y = y) = (1− µ(y))n−1µ(y). (16)
Clearly, the unconditional service time distribution is no longer geometric. Since we are interested only
in comparing the cost obtained here with the one obtained with a constant service rate to see the effect
of variation in service rate, we assume X and Y as independent, uniformly distributed random variables
in [0, 1].
Also, inspired by the classical result in psychology called Fitts’ Law (in its so-called Shannon formu-
lation) [30], let
µ = µ0 + log(1 + Y ). (17)
The capacity of a human increases with the demands of the task in a concave fashion, since human
capacity is limited [8]. The choice of log ensures that the service rate increases with Y , but the rate
of increase is a decreasing function of Y ; the constant ensures that the service rate does not fall below
a minimum value for any task. Substituting this expression for µ in (16) and using (14) yields the
unconditional probability mass function for the service time as:
P(S = n) =
∫ 1
y=0
(1− µ0 − log(1 + y))n−1 (µ0 + log(1 + y)) dy.
To obtain numerical values, we use µ0 = 15 . This gives
µ̂ = 0.5 and v̂ar(S) = 3.35.
For Poisson arrivals, var(Λx) = λx. As X is a uniform random variable,
λx = λp = λ
∫ 1
u=x
fU (u) du = λ (1− x) .
Substituting the values of λx, µ̂ and v̂ar(S) (in λx, µ and var(S), respectively) in (15), we obtain the
following expression for Ĉo as a function of λ:
Ĉo =
2λ(20λ− 87) + 3(9λ− 29) log(1− 2λ)
160λ2
. (18)
Keeping the load constant (µ = µ̂) and substituting the value of λx, we obtain, using (13), an expression
for Co (cost for the case of constant service rate) as a function of λ:
Co =
2λ2 − 6λ− 3 log(1− 2λ)
8λ2
. (19)
For this case, var(S) = 2.
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Fig. 3. Cost as a function of λ.
2) Plotted Results: Continuing with the example, Fig. 3 plots the variation of cost with the arrival
rate. Comparing Ĉo with Co, it turns out that Ĉo > Co for all values of λ. This suggests that the cost
incurred by the principal is higher when the agent’s working rate depends on his interest in the task,
compared to the cost when the agent’s working rate is the same for each task he faces. An explanation
for this observation is that the variance of the service time distribution is greater for the case of variable
service rate compared to that for the constant service rate. Larger variance in the service times typically
implies longer expected sojourn times, which leads to a larger cost.
The above observation also points to a larger principle in sociotechnical systems: unlike machines,
people have interests and preferences for what they are doing. This makes them more variable and hence
less efficient, compared to a machine that works at the same average rate.
Having seen how the agent’s self-interests in the tasks and misalignment with the principal affect the
principal in the form of cost, we next look at what the principal can do.
C. Principal’s role: Incentivizing agent
How can the principal compensate for the agent’s lack of alignment? Recall that, in the priority-
variation setting, the agent prioritizes according to random variable Z given by (7), where γ ∈ [0, 1] is
the importance the agent assigns to the principal’s interests due to some extrinsic motivation offered. Let
β be the incentive that the principal gives to the agent, such that the prioritization weight is an increasing
function of incentive, γ = f(β). We aim to find structural properties for the incentive that optimizes the
13
principal’s utility.
The principal’s utility function is:
U = −β − θC(f(β)),
where C(f(β)) is the cost function (12) for γ = f(β), and θ is the constant loss to the principal per unit
cost. The utility function comprises the incentive (in monetary value) given to the agent and the loss (in
monetary value) incurred due to cost C. To find the optimal β, we solve the following optimization:
max
β
U
s. t. β ≥ 0.
The solution depends on the function f , and the problem may be non-convex optimization in general,
but we can easily find numerical solutions. An interesting property of the optimal incentive β, denoted
β∗, is as follows.
Proposition 1: For any increasing function γ = f(β), the optimal incentive β∗ is a non-increasing
function of alignment ρ.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We see that if the alignment between the principal and the agent increases, the principal should not
increase the payment to the agent.
IV. MULTI-AGENT PRINCIPAL-AGENT COMMUNICATION
It seems reasonable to presume the principal’s cost should decrease if the principal chooses to allocate
a given task to one among several agents, but can the principal take advantage of the agents’ abilities to
further reduce her cost?
Consider a principal-agent communication problem where the principal has two agents to allocate tasks
to. We assume each task has three kinds of interests: X , Y1, and Y2, corresponding to the principal and
the two agents, respectively. The principal routes tasks to agents based on limited information about X ,
Y1, and Y2. Agent i prioritizes tasks as some function of X and Yi. As stated in Sec. II, we consider a
memoryless task allocation policy to the agents. The cost is denoted Cm.
We devise two variations of this model, on similar lines as in the single-agent case.
• Priority variation with agent’s interests: Each agent serves tasks at the same rate, but prioritizes the
tasks as a function of the principal’s and his own interests. For concreteness, we make the same
modeling assumption as in the one-agent priority variation: X and Yi, i = 1, 2 are distributed as
jointly Gaussian random variables.
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• Service rate variation with agent’s interests: Each agent prioritizes the tasks according to the princi-
pal’s interests, but serves tasks at different rates based on his own interests in the tasks. We use the
same modeling assumption as in the one-agent case: X and Yi, i = 1, 2 are distributed as uniform
random variables, while Y1 and Y2 are independent random variables.
Our first contribution in this section lies in showing that the routing policy that minimizes the cost of
certain important tasks, with the overall cost constrained to be minimal, is a threshold policy. Second,
we show that diversity of interests in a workforce is beneficial only if the principal can identify it.
A. Priority variation
Consider X and Yi as jointly Gaussian random variables with correlation coefficients ρi, i = 1, 2. We
assume that the two agents’ interests are conditionally independent. The correlation coefficients capture
the principal’s alignment with the two agents. We also assume that the means of the three random
variables are large positive values, so that almost all tasks have positive priorities. To understand the
significance of this assumption, consider the following: Suppose the three random variables are zero-
mean. For any queue, given a value of λi and a well-aligned agent, the cost is negative. Decreasing λi
for a queue then results in an increase in the cost for that queue, since the delay for the low-priority
(negative-priority) tasks decreases. This undesirable effect is due to the fact zero-mean random variables
have an equal support set on the positive and negative real axis. Note that we did not have to worry
about this assumption in the one-agent case because we were dealing with constant λ.
While this model is an extension of the single-agent priority-variation model, for simplicity let us
suppose that agents prioritize tasks strictly according to their own interest and do not care about the
principal’s interest. Unlike in the one-agent model, the principal routes tasks to the agents based on the
information she has about the agents’ interests in the tasks, along with her own interest in the tasks.
We assume the principal only has statistical information about the agents’ interests, in the form of the
agents’ correlations with the principal, ρ1 and ρ2, rather than information about specific realizations.
Let {R = i} denote the event that a task is routed to the ith agent, i = 1, 2. The cost function for two
agents can be expanded as follows:
Cm = E[XD]
= E[XD1{R=1}] + E[XD1{R=2}]
= E[XD | R = 1]P(R = 1) + E[XD | R = 2]P(R = 2), (20)
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where 1{·} is an indicator random variable, E[XD | R = i] is the cost for tasks in the ith queue, and
P(R = i) is the unconditional routing probability to the ith queue.
Note that the joint distribution of X and D given the unconditional routing event {R = i} is the
same as the unconditional joint distribution. To see how, since P(R = i) is the unconditional routing
probability, it is the same for all tasks and hence is independent of X and D. As a result, E[XD | R = i]
is the same as the cost for the single-agent system. Using (6), for Poisson distribution of task arrivals
and geometric distribution of service rates, E[XD | R = 1] is given by
E[XD | R = 1] =
∫
y
(
µx + ρ1
σx
σ1,y
(y − µ1,y)
)(
2µ1 − 2µ1λ1,y + λ21,y
2(µ1 − λ1,y)2
)
fY1(y) dy, (21)
and similarly,
E[XD | R = 2] =
∫
y
(
µx + ρ2
σx
σ2,y
(y − µ2,y)
)(
2µ2 − 2µ2λ2,y + λ22,y
2(µ2 − λ2,y)2
)
fY2(y) dy, (22)
where µx and σ2x are the mean and variance of the random variable X , µi,y and σ
2
i,y are the mean and
variance of the random variable Yi, i = 1, 2, µi is the service rate for the ith agent and λi,y is the average
number of task arrivals in the ith queue in a time step with priorities higher than y.
1) Minimizing the total cost: The principal routes tasks based on her own interests in the tasks, X ,
and the statistical information about the agents’ interests, ρ1 and ρ2. Let p(x, ρ1, ρ2) and 1− p(x, ρ1, ρ2)
be the conditional routing probabilities that a task with priority X = x is routed to the first and the
second agent, respectively. This can be written as
p(x, ρ1, ρ2) = P(1(R=1) = 1 | X = x) (23)
= P(R = 1 | X = x), (24)
where 1{R=i} is 1 for tasks routed to the ith queue and zero otherwise. Therefore, the unconditional
routing probability is
P(R = 1) = E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)]. (25)
Our aim is to find the optimal routing function that minimizes the cost:
min
p(x,ρ1,ρ2)
Cm
s. t. 0 ≤ p(x, ρ1, ρ2) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ R. (26)
Before we solve optimization problem (26), the following lemma illustrates the dependency of the cost
function on the conditional routing probability.
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Lemma 1: The cost for the principal Cm depends on p(X, ρ1, ρ2) only through E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)], the
unconditional routing probability.
Proof: See Appendix B.
This shows that the cost does not change with the task allocation function as long as its expected value
is fixed.
The minimization in (26) can be carried out only over E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)].
min
p(x)
Cm (27)
s. t. 0 ≤ E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)] ≤ 1. (28)
Under certain conditions, it can be shown that the above optimization problem is convex; the means
of the random variables dictating the convexity of this optimization problem. Refer appendix C for a
detailed analysis.
An important point to note here is that the principal routes a task without knowing the realizations
of agents’ interests (the principal only has statistical knowledge of alignment in the form of ρ1 and ρ2).
Therefore the principal needs to avoid overloading any server, and hence the best she can do is maintain
an average task routing probability.
Given the optimal unconditional routing probability arg minCm, the principal can vary the routing
probability p(x, ρ1, ρ2) to affect the cost for a subset of tasks, keeping the overall cost at the minimum
value. An interesting problem then is to determine how the principal chooses the routing probability
p(x, ρ1, ρ2) to minimize the cost of some “important” tasks, keeping overall cost at minimum. Therefore,
we next look at finding the optimal routing policy to minimize the cost of certain high-priority tasks.
2) Minimizing the cost for high-priority tasks: Let p∗ be the average routing probability that minimizes
the cost in the previous case, i.e.,
p∗ = arg minCm.
Constraining the average routing probability to p∗, we want to find the routing function that minimizes
the cost of tasks with priorities higher than a given value x∗:
min
p(x)
E[XD | X > x∗]
s. t. 0 ≤ p(x, ρ1, ρ2) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ R
E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)] = p∗. (29)
The optimal policy has a threshold structure.
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Proposition 2: The optimal routing policy that satisfies (29) is a threshold policy, given by
p(x, ρ1, ρ2) = 0, for ED,1(x) > ED,2(x),
p(x, ρ1, ρ2) = 1, for ED,1(x) < ED,2(x),
p(x, ρ1, ρ2) ∈ [0, 1], for ED,1(x) = ED,2(x),
where x > x∗ and ED,i(x) is the average delay of a task with priority x given it is routed to the ith
queue.
Proof: See Appendix D.
This is the optimal threshold policy for tasks with priorities greater than x∗. To find the complete routing
function, we use the constraint E[p(X)] = p∗. Further, it is shown in Appendix D that ED,1(x) and
ED,2(x) depend on p(x, ρ1, ρ2) only through E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)].
This shows that by keeping the average routing probability fixed, the principal can vary the routing
function so as to vary the cost of a particular subset of tasks, without affecting the overall cost. This
turns out to be an added advantage of having two agents, along with the obvious benefit of less cost.
Next, we consider the service rate variation version of the model: agents prioritize tasks according to
the principal’s interests, but vary their service rates according to their own interests.
B. Service rate variation
An agent’s service rate is a function of interest in the task, i.e.,
µ = µ(Yi).
Since the working rate of a person cannot increase as fast as his interest, we assume µ(Y ) is a concave
function. As in (17), we assume the following functional form for µ(Yi):
µ(Yi) = µ0 + log(1 + Yi).
We aim to characterize the impact of diversity in agent interests on the cost to the principal, analyzing
performance when the principal has complete knowledge of the agents’ interest-realizations. In this setting,
we look at several cases based on the correlation between the agents’ interests, comparing cost against
agents working at a constant rate. Later we consider a more practical setting where the principal has noisy
measurements of the agents’ interest-realizations. Similar to single-agent service-rate variation, here we
assume X,Y1, Y2 are marginally uniformly distributed in [0, 1], and that X is independent of Yi, i = 1, 2.
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To find the complete cost function, recall from (20) that the cost function for the two-agent model is:
Cm = E[XD | R = 1]P(R = 1) + E[XD | R = 2]P(R = 2), (30)
where E[XD | R = i] is the cost for the tasks routed to the ith queue and P(R = i) is the unconditional
routing probability to the ith queue. Once again we see that the joint distribution of X and D given
the unconditional routing function (R = 1) is the same as the unconditional joint distribution, since
(R = 1) is independent of both X and D. Using (15), for Poisson distribution of task arrival process
and geometric distribution of conditional service times, E[XD | R = 1] can be expanded as
E[XD | R = 1] =
∫
x
xfX(x)dx
(
(2µ1 − λ1,x)
2(µ1 − λ1,x)2
+
λ1,xµ
2
1var (S1)
2(µ1 − λ1,x)2
− λ1,x
2 (µ1 − λ1,x)
)
, (31)
and for the second agent as
E[XD | R = 2] =
∫
x
xfX(x)dx
(
(2µ2 − λ2,x)
2(µ2 − λ2,x)2
+
λ2,xµ
2
2var (S2)
2(µ2 − λ2,x)2
− λ2,x
2 (µ2 − λ2,x)
)
. (32)
where µi is the service rate of the ith agent, λi,x is the average number of task arrivals in the ith queue
in a time step with priorities higher than x, and var(Si) is the variance of execution times for the ith
agent.
As the tasks are assigned to the two agents, the distribution of the agent priorities in the queues would
be different from their unconditional distributions. Therefore, we denote by random variables Z1 and Z2
the agent priorities that reach the first queue and the second queue, respectively. In other words, Z1 and
Z2 represent the agent priorities of the tasks in the first and the second queue, respectively. Note that the
X values remain the same. To find the cost function for different cases, we first find the distribution of
Z1 and Z2. Then we find the values for the unconditional service rates, µ1 and µ2, and the variance of
the service times, var(S1) and var(S2), using the following set of equations:
P(Si = n) = E [P(Si = n | Zi)] , i = 1, 2.
P(Si = n | Zi = z) = (1− µ(z))n−1µ(z), i = 1, 2. (33)
µ(Zi) = µ0 + log(1 + Zi), i = 1, 2.
where (33) follows from the assumption that the conditional service time of a task is geometrically
distributed. We then substitute these values in the expression for cost and compare different cost functions
by plotting. To obtain numerical values, we use µ0 = 15 .
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1) Effect of diversity: We assume that for each task, the principal knows the exact realizations of the
agents’ interests. We assume the following routing policy for the principal: Each task is routed to the
agent who has a higher priority for that task. Then, since Y1 and Y2 are identically distributed, we have
P(R = 1) = P(R = 2) =
1
2
.
Clearly, the routing policy depends on the relation between the agents’ interests. Let us first express Z1
and Z2 in terms of Y1 and Y2:
Z1 =
Y1, when Y1 > Y2, w.p. 1Y1, when Y1 < Y2, w.p. 0. (34)
Z2 =
Y2, when Y2 > Y1, w.p. 1Y2, when Y2 < Y1, w.p. 0. (35)
Let ρG denote the correlation between the two agents. We analyze this regime for different levels of
diversity in the agents’ interests.
A) Perfect diversity (ρG = −1): The two agents’ interests are completely negatively correlated, i.e.,
Y2 = 1− Y1. Using (34) and (35),
P(Z1 ≤ z) = P(Y1 ≤ z | Y1 > Y2)
= P(Y1 ≤ z, Y1 > 12)/P(Y1 > 12)
= 2z − 1.
Similarly, P(Z2 ≤ z) = 2z − 1. As a result, Z1, Z2 ∼ U [12 , 1]. Once again, computations yield:
µi = 0.75, var(Si) = 0.5, i = 1, 2.
B) Imperfect diversity (ρG ∈ (−1, 0]): Consider next a more realistic case, where the diversity in agents’
interests is not perfect. In this case, we model Y1 and Y2 as the marginals of a Gaussian copula:
CρG(y1, y2) =
Φ−1(y1)∫
−∞
Φ−1(y2)∫
−∞
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2G
exp
(
−s
2 − 2ρGst+ t2
2(1− ρ2G)
)
ds dt, (36)
where Φ−1(·) is the quasi-inverse of standard normal distribution, and ρG is the correlation in the
bivariate normal distribution. Due to symmetry, the distribution of Z1 and Z2 will be the same. We
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compute the service rate and variance of service times for three values of ρG. Using (34), (35) and
(36), in Appendix E we obtain the following values of µ and var(S):
µi = 0.68, var(Si) = 2.48, ρG = −0.8,
µi = 0.59, var(Si) = 2.73, ρG = −0.4,
µi = 0.53, var(Si) = 2.99, ρG = 0.
For comparison, we consider the setting where agents have constant service rate and assume indepen-
dent Bernoulli routing for each task with parameter p0. By symmetry, we see the minimum cost will
be achieved at p0 = 12 which yields unconditional service times that are geometrically distributed. We
choose the average service rates to be equal to the unconditional average service rates for independent
agents. Thus, µ1 = µ2 = 0.53, which gives var(Si) = 1.67, i = 1, 2.
Plotted results: Fig. 4 shows the cost function for different values of correlation between the agent
interests, along with the machine (constant service) case, against the arrival rate λ. The fact variance is
lower for the machine case compared to the independent agents case is manifested in the form of less
cost for the machine case. This is similar to the single-agent model, where the machine case has less
cost than the variable agent case. However, note that the cost is significantly lower than the machine
case when there is a high level of interest diversity among the agents. This is since one of the agents is
often highly interested in each task, and the principal routes to that agent. Therefore, variable agents are
desirable for the principal if they have enough diversity, and the principal has knowledge of the diversity.
The principal can take advantage of diverse agents interests by routing each task appropriately according
to agent interests.
The principal, however, may not have complete knowledge of agents’ interest realizations. We therefore
consider a principal having quantal measurements of the agents’ interests.
2) Quantal perception of the agents’ interest-realizations: Suppose the principal does not have exact
knowledge of the agents’ interest-realizations. When interest-realizations are either high or low, the
principal can route them correctly, but for intermediate levels of interest, the principal may perceive
erroneously. Specifically, suppose the principal correctly perceives high-interest values in the range [q, 1]
and low-interest values in the range [0, q]. Since the principal is unsure about interest values in the range
(1−q, q), she makes a random routing decision in this case of erasure. Let p be the probability an ‘unsure’
task is routed to the first agent. For computation, we consider p = 12 , implying P(R = 1) = P(R = 2) =
1
2
in (30). Let us find the cost function, considering perfect negative correlation among the agent interests.
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Fig. 4. Cost as a function of the arrival rate λ to show the effect of diversity among agents’ interests: (a) Machine case
(constant), (b) Independent agents (ρG = 0), (c),(d) Imperfect negative correlation (ρG = −0.8, ρG = −0.4), (e) Completely
diverse agents (ρG = −1)
We first compute the distributions of Z1 and Z2. Observe that Z1 can be written as
Z1 =
Y1, when Y1 ∈ [q, 1], w.p. 1Y1, when Y1 ∈ [1− q, q], w.p. 12 .
Therefore, Z1 is uniform in both intervals. After normalizing:
fZ1(z) =
2, z ∈ [q, 1]1, z ∈ [1− q, q].
Since, the region of uncertainty is symmetric, and Y2 = 1− Y1, the distribution of Z2 is the same as Z1
and the cost function will be equal for both queues. With computation, we can find µ and var(S), which
will be functions of q. Therefore, the cost function for this case will be a function of q as well.
What happens as the number of agents increases? The cost obviously decreases with an increase in the
number of agents. In addition, as the following proposition shows, the dependence of cost on λ vanishes
as the number of agents goes to infinity, while the sojourn time of a task approaches its service time.
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Fig. 5. Cost as a function of λ for different values of q along with the machine case and the asymptotic case, showing the
effect of principal’s knowledge about the agents’ interest-realizations. Note that q = 1 and q = 0.5 correspond to ρG = 0 and
ρG = −1 in Fig. 4, respectively.
Proposition 3: The asymptotic cost C∞ is given by
C∞ =
1
2µ(y)
∣∣∣∣
y=1
,
which implies that each task receives the maximum service rate in the asymptotic case.
Proof: See Appendix F.
As the number of agents increases, the service rate of each task approaches to the maximum possible
value. Again, when there is high diversity in the agents’ interests, and the principal is aware of it, the
principal can obtain higher working rate for each task.
3) Plotted results: Fig. 5 plots cost functions for different values of erasure threshold q along with the
machine case, for the same λ. Note that q = 1 corresponds to random routing due to fully incomplete
knowledge of agents’ interest-realizations. This is equivalent to the case when the principal has exact
knowledge of the agents’ interest realizations while the agents’ interests are independent. A similar
correspondence holds between q = 0.5 and ρa = −1.
Evidently, the q = 1 curve performs worse than the machine case, while q = 0.5 performs much better.
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This shows that the diversity in the agents’ interests is favorable for the principal if the principal is aware
of it, but can be undesirable otherwise. Notice also that the cost function for q = 0.9 is less than the
machine case. This shows that when there is high diversity, the principal needs to route correctly only a
few high priority tasks.
V. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the fact that people perform routine tasks by prioritizing them, we viewed the human
priority queue from a principal-agent perspective. For the single-agent setting, our model serves to quantify
the effect of misalignment between the priorities of the task sender and the receiver. In particular, we
characterize how the cost to the sender varies with the correlation between the agent’s and the principal’s
interests, and with the prioritizing function chosen by the agent. We established that while it is favorable
for the principal to have an agent with high intrinsic alignment, it is possible for the principal to attract
the agent in her favor by means of extrinsic motivation, if the agent is not intrinsically well-aligned with
the principal. We also argued that humans typically have a larger variance in task execution compared
to machines, due to interests that govern their functioning. Lastly, we obtained an interesting structural
property of the incentive that the principal offers to the agent as an extrinsic motivation.
In the two-agent setting, we established that the optimal task assignment policy that minimizes the
cost for all the tasks depends only on the average routing probability. In addition, we showed that a task
assignment policy can be chosen to affect a subset of the task without changing the overall cost. Finally,
we showed that unlike the one-agent case, variability in human interests can be potentially favorable to
the principal and proved that a workforce with diverse interests is beneficial if the principal can identify
it, but otherwise not.
Validating these qualitative results certainly necessitates justifying robustness of the mathematical model
used. As such, we emphasize that while the exact mathematical model may not precisely capture the real-
world scenario, the arguments and results we have adopted capture the basic essence of the principal-agent
queuing problem in ways that are described in the behavioral and social sciences.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Recall Fig. 2, which relates cost C to alignment ρ. Also recall the utility function for the principal is
U = −β− θC(f(β)), where β is the incentive paid to the agent, θ is the per unit weighted sojourn time
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cost, and C(·) is the cost function given in (12). C(·) is simply C(·) = C1ρx,z , where C1 is a negative
constant given by
C1 =
∫ ∞
z=−∞
(
1√
2pi
exp
(
−z2
2
))(
z
2µ− 2µλQ(z) + λ2Q2(z)
2(µ− λQ (z))2
)
dz,
and ρx,z is the correlation between the principal’s and agent’s interests. Taking γ = f(β), and using the
expression for ρx,z in (9), the utility function is:
U = −β − θ C1 (γ + ρ (1− γ))√
γ2 + (1− γ)2 + 2ργ (1− γ)
.
Let β∗ be the optimum incentive and γ∗ = f(β∗). Recalling f is an increasing function, we need to
show β∗ is a non-increasing function of ρ. Consider the following:
max
β∗
U = −β∗ − θ C1 (γ
∗ + ρ (1− γ∗))√
γ∗2 + (1− γ∗)2 + 2ργ∗ (1− γ∗)
.
At ρ = −1,
max
β∗
U
∣∣∣∣
ρ=−1
= −β∗ − θC1 (2γ
∗ − 1)
|2γ∗ − 1| .
Since C1 is negative,
arg max
γ∗
U
∣∣∣∣
ρ=−1
=
(
1
2
)+
.
Now, for all values of γ > 12 , cost is a decreasing function of ρ. This implies arg max
γ∗
U does not
increase with increase in ρ. Since γ∗ is an increasing function of β∗, the result follows.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From (20), the cost function for the two-agent case is
Cm = E[XD | R = 1]P(R = 1) + E[XD | R = 2]P(R = 2), (37)
where P(R = i) is the unconditional routing probability to the ith queue, and E[XD|R = i] is the cost
for tasks in the ith queue. We develop the proof for the first queue, and the proof for the second queue
will follow identically. Using (21), the cost for the tasks in the first queue is
E[XD | R = 1] =
∫
y
(
µx + ρ1
σx
σy
(y − µ1,y)
)(
2µ1 − 2µ1λ1,y + λ21,y
2(µ1 − λ1,y)2
)
fY1(y) dy, (38)
where µx and µ1,y are the means of X and Y1 respectively, σ2x and σ
2
y are the respective variances, ρ1
is the correlation coefficient, µ1 is the unconditional service rate, and λ1,y is the average number of task
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arrivals in a time step with priorities higher than Y1 = y. Note that none of these variables except λ1,y
can depend on p(x). Therefore, let us derive the expression for λ1,y.
Let Λ1,y(z) be the generating function for the number of tasks that arrive to the first queue in a time
slot with priorities higher than Y1 = y. Denote by Ey(k) the event that k tasks arrive to the first queue
in a time slot with priorities higher than Y1 = y. Then,
Λ1,y(z) =
∞∑
k=0
P (Ey(k)) zk. (39)
Note that P (Ey(k)) can be written as
P (Ey(k))
=
∞∑
n=k
P (Ey(k) | E1(n))P (E1(n))
=
∞∑
n=k
P (Ey(k) | E1(n))
∞∑
m=n
P (E1(n) | E(m))P (E(m)) . (40)
where we define the events E1(n) and E(m) as: E1(n) , n tasks arrive to the first queue in a time slot,
and E(m) , m tasks arrive to the principal in a time slot.
Let py be the probability that an arriving task has a priority higher than Y1 = y. Then,
P (Ey(k) | E(n)) =
(
n
k
)
(py)
k(1− py)n−k. (41)
Let a(m) be the probability that m tasks arrive to the principal in a time slot. Let Λ(z) be the generating
function for the number of task arrivals to the principal in a time slot, so that
Λ(z) =
∞∑
m=0
a(m)zm.
Recall from (25) that E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)] is the unconditional probability of routing a task to the first agent,
which for brevity we denote by q.
P (E1(n) | E(m))
=
(
m
n
)
qn(1− q)m−n. (42)
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Substituting (40), (41) and (42) in (39) gives
Λ1,y(z)
=
∞∑
k=0
zk
∞∑
n=k
(
n
k
)
(py)
k(1− py)n−k
∞∑
m=n
a(m)
(
m
n
)
qn(1− q)m−n
=
∞∑
m=0
a(m)
m∑
n=0
(
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
(py)
k(1− py)n−kzk
)(
m
n
)
qn(1− q)m−n
=
∞∑
m=0
a(m)
m∑
n=0
(zpy + 1− py)n
(
m
n
)
qn(1− q)m−n
=
∞∑
m=0
a(m)((zpy + 1− py) q)m
(a)
= Λ ((zpy + 1− py) (E [p(X, ρ1, ρ2)])) ,
where (a) is obtained by substituting back q = E [p(X, ρ1, ρ2)]. As a result,
λ1,y = Λ
′
1,y(z) = λpyE [p(X, ρ1, ρ2)] (43)
and similarly
λ2,y = Λ
′
2,y(z) = λpy (1− E [p(X, ρ1, ρ2)]) . (44)
Therefore, the overall cost function depends on p(x) only through E [p(X, ρ1, ρ2)].
APPENDIX C
ON THE CONVEXITY OF MULTI-AGENT COST FUNCTION
Proposition 4: Cm is a convex function of E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)] when µx − µyi is sufficiently large.
Proof: Let q = E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)]. Using (20), we expand Cm as follows
Cm = E[XD | R = 1]P(R = 1) + E[XD | R = 2]P(R = 2), (45)
where, as before, {R = i} is the event that a task is routed to the ith queue, and E[XD | R = i] is the
cost for tasks in the ith queue, given by
E[XD | R = i] =
∫
y
(
µx + ρi
σx
σyi
(y − µyi)
)(
2µi − 2µiλyi + λ2yi
2(µi − λyi)2
)
fYi(y) dy. (46)
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For brevity, and without loss of generalization, let σx = σyi = 1. For convexity, we must show that the
second derivative of (45) is non-negative. Substituting (46) in (45) and differentiating gives
d2Cm
dq2
= 4
∫
y
(µx + ρ1(y − µy1))
(
(2µ− µ2)λQ(y − µy1)
2(µ− λqQ(y − µy1))3
)
fY1(y)dy
+ 6q
∫
y
(µx + ρ1(y − µy1))
(
(2µ− µ2)λ2Q2(y − µy1)
2(µ− λqQ(y − µy1))4
)
fY1(y)dy
+ 4
∫
y
(µx + ρ2(y − µy2))
(
(2µ− µ2)λQ(y − µy2)
2(µ− λ(1− q)Q(y − µy2))3
)
fY2(y)dy
+ 6(1− q)
∫
y
(µx + ρ2(y − µy2))
(
(2µ− µ2)λ2Q2(y − µy2)
2(µ− λ(1− q)Q(y − µy2))4
)
fY2(y)dy. (47)
Consider the first term:
4
∫
y
(µx + ρ1(y − µy1))
(
(2µ− µ2)λQ(y − µy1)
2(µ− λqQ(y − µy1))3
)
fY1(y) dy. (48)
To show that (48) is positive, we write the following inequality:∫
y
(µx + ρ1(y − µy1))
(
(2µ− µ2)λQ(y − µy1)
2(µ− λp0Q(y − µy1))3
)
fY1(y) dy
≥ (2µ− µ
2)λ
µ3
∫
y
(µx + ρ1(y − µy1))Q(y − µy1)fY1(y) dy. (49)
Using similar inequalities, (47) can be written as
d2Cm
dq2
≥ (2µ− µ
2)λ
2µ3
(
2
∫
y
(µx + ρ1(y − µy1))Q(y − µy1)fY1(y) dy
+
3qλ
µ
∫
y
(µx + ρ1(y − µy1))Q(y − µy1)fY1(y) dy
+ 2
∫
y
(µx + ρ2(y − µy2))Q(y − µy2)fY2(y) dy
+
3(1− q)λ
µ
∫
y
(µx + ρ2(y − µy2))Q(y − µy2)fY2(y) dy
)
(50)
fYi(y) is symmetric about µyi with equal values on both the sides. Q(y−µyi) is a decreasing function
for all y. As a result, (49) is positive if (µx− ρiµyi) takes sufficiently large value. A sufficient condition
for this to happen is when (µx−µyi) takes sufficiently large value for any µyi . For this particular example,
where σx = σyi = 1, we find using numerical computation that a threshold for sufficiently large is given
by (µx − µyi) > 23 .
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APPENDIX D
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 2
We write
E[XD | X > x∗] = 1
P(X > x∗)
E[XD1{X>x∗}].
For a fixed x∗, P(X > x∗) is a constant. The remaining term can be expanded as follows:
E[XD1{X>x∗}] = E[E[XD1{X>x∗} | X]]
=
∞∫
x=x∗
xE[D | X = x]fX(x) dx. (51)
Recall that a task with priority x is routed to the first agent with probability p(x, ρ1, ρ2) and the second
with probability 1− p(x, ρ1, ρ2). Therefore,
E[D | X = x] = p(x, ρ1, ρ2)E[D | X = x, 1]
+ (1− p(x, ρ1, ρ2))E[D | X = x, 2], (52)
where E[D | X = x, i] is the average delay of a task with priority x given it is routed to the ith queue.
For brevity, denote E[D | X = x, i] as ED,i(x). Substituting (52) in (51) gives
E[XD1{X>x∗}] (53)
=
∞∫
x=x∗
x (p(x) (ED,1(x)− ED,2(x)) + ED,2(x)) fX(x).
The minimization problem now becomes
min
p(x)
∞∫
x=x∗
x (p(x) (ED,1(x)− ED,2(x)) + ED,2(x)) fX(x)
s. t. 0 ≤ p(x, ρ1, ρ2) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ R
E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)] = p∗.
(54)
We first show that ED,1(x) depends on p(X, ρ1, ρ2) only through E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)]. To do so, we expand
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ED,1 (x) as follows:
ED,1 (x) =E [D | X = x,R = 1]
=E [E [D | X = x,R = 1, Y1] | X = x,R = 1]
=
∞∫
y=−∞
E [D | X = x, Y1 = y,R = 1] fY1|X,U (y | x, 1) dx
(a)
=
∞∫
y=−∞
E [D | Y1 = y,R = 1] fY1|X,R (y | x, 1) dx
=
∫
y
(
2µ− 2µλ1,y + λ21,y
2(µ− λ1,y)2
)
fY1|X,R(y | x, 1), (55)
where {R = 1} denotes the first agent, λ1,y is the arrival rate of tasks to the first agent with priorities
higher than y, and (a) follows from the fact that given the Y priority of a task, its average delay is
independent of X . E [D|X = x, Y1 = y,R = 1] is the average sojourn time for a task routed to the first
queue.
Consider the conditional density function fY1|X,R(y|x, 1). This can be written as
fY1|X,R(y|x, 1) =
fY1,X|R(y, x|1)
fX|R(x|1)
.
The conditional joint distribution of X and Y1 given R in the numerator is the same as the unconditional
joint distribution. This is because R = 1 is the unconditional routing probability and hence has the
same probability for each task. Similarly the conditional distribution of X given R is the same as the
unconditional distribution of X . Therefore fY1|X,R(y|x, 1) is independent of p(X, ρ1, ρ2). Also, as shown
in Appendix B, λ1,y depends on p(X, ρ1, ρ2) only through E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)]. Further, note that no other
variable in (55) depends on p(X, ρ1, ρ2). This implies that ED,1(x) depends on p(X, ρ1, ρ2) only through
E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)].
Finally, note that minimizing (54) is the same as minimizing its integrand at each x ∈ (x∗,∞). Since
ED,1(x) depends on p(X, ρ1, ρ2) only through E[p(X, ρ1, ρ2)], the minima depends on the value of the
coefficient of p(x). Hence, the result follows.
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APPENDIX E
COST FUNCTION FOR GAUSSIAN COPULA
We model Y1 and Y2 as the marginals of a Gaussian copula:
CρG(y1, y2) =
Φ−1(y1)∫
−∞
Φ−1(y2)∫
−∞
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2G
exp
(
−s
2 − 2ρGst+ t2
2(1− ρ2G)
)
ds dt, (56)
where Φ−1(·) is the quasi-inverse of standard normal distribution, and ρG is the correlation in the bivariate
normal distribution. Due to symmetry, the distribution of Z1 and Z2 will be the same.
Let us find the distribution of Z1. We write
P(Z1 ≤ z) =P(Y1 ≤ z | Y1 > Y2)
=
P(Y1 ≤ z, Y1 > Y2)
P(Y1 > Y2)
. (57)
We consider the case when ρG = −0.8. Using (56),
P(Y1 ≤ z, Y1 > Y2)
=
Φ−1(z)∫
y=−∞
y∫
x=−∞
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2 exp
(
−x
2 − 2ρxy + y2
2(1− ρ2)
)
dx dy
=
Φ−1(z)∫
y=−∞
(
1 + erf
(
3√
2
y
))
exp
(
−y22
)
2
√
2pi
dy. (58)
Substituting z = 1 in (58) gives
P(Y1 > Y2) =
1
2
.
Therefore,
P(Z1 ≤ z) =
Φ−1(z)∫
y=−∞
(
1 + erf
(
3√
2
y
))
exp
(
−y22
)
√
2pi
dy. (59)
To find the density function, we differentiate the above equation. Letting z = Φ(τ) and using Leibniz
rule in (59) gives
fZ1(z) =
dΦ−1(z)
dz
(
1 + erf
(
3√
2
Φ−1(z)
))
exp
(
− (Φ−1(z))22
)
√
2pi
,
where
dΦ−1(z)
dz
=
1
dz/dτ
=
√
2pi exp
((
Φ−1(z)
)2
2
)
. (60)
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As a result,
fZ1(z) =
(
1 + erf
(
3√
2
Φ−1(z)
))
.
Similarly, we obtain the density function for ρG = −0.4 and ρG = 0. Using these density functions in
(33) gives
µi = 0.68, var(Si) = 2.48, ρG = −0.8,
µi = 0.59, var(Si) = 2.73, ρG = −0.4,
µi = 0.53, var(Si) = 2.99, ρG = 0.
The cost can be easily computed using these values.
APPENDIX F
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 3
Consider the principal having n agents to allocate tasks to. Let Y1, . . . , Yn be the random variables that
denote the interests of the n agents. We assume that the principal knows the agents’ interest-realizations
for each task. Let {R = 1} be the event that a task is routed to the first queue. Since the agents work at
variable rates, let µ(Yk) be the conditional service rate for the kth agent. As earlier, we consider µ(Yk)
to be a concave function and to be a common mapping across all agents k.
In the two-agent case, choosing agents with completely negatively correlated interests was advanta-
geous, since it ensured maximum diversity in the agents’ interests. In order to have complete diversity
in the interest sets with n agents, we create the following relation structure: the random variable Yk is
distributed uniformly in [k−1n ,
k
n ]. Though highly simplified, this model is a good representation of the
interests when the number of agents is large and the agents have fairly diverse interests.
The routing policy is trivial: route a task to the agent who is interested in it. Let Zk be the random
variable denoting the interests of the tasks in the queue of the kth agent. Then, the distribution for the
{Zk} is the same as the {Yk}:
Zk ∼ U
(
k − 1
n
,
k
n
)
, k = 1, . . . , n.
Let Mn denote the set of service rates for each agent when the total number of agents is n. Then,
Mn =
(
µ
(
k − 1
n
)
, µ
(
k
n
))
.
Since the agents have the same set of service rates,
Mn =
(
µ
(
n− 1
n
)
, µ (1)
)
.
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Note thatM∞, the set of service rates for each agent when the number of agents is infinite, is a singleton
set given by µ(1). Denote by M̂n the unconditional service rate for a pool of n agents. Then,
M̂∞ = lim
n→∞M̂n = µ(y)
∣∣∣∣
y=1
. (61)
Let Cn be the cost function for this case when there are n agents. For brevity, denote pi = P(R = i).
Cn expands as
Cn =
n∑
i=1
E[XD|R = i]pi. (62)
By symmetry, it is clear
pi =
1
n
, i = 1, . . . , n.
As a result, (62) becomes
Cn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[XD|R = i].
From (31), E[XD|R = i] can be expressed as
E[XD | U = i] =
∫
x
xfX(x)dx
(
(2µi − λi,x)
2(µi − λi,x)2
+
λi,xµ
2
i var (Si)
2(µi − λi,x)2
− λi,x
2 (µi − λi,x)
)
, (63)
where µi is the unconditional service rate for the ith task and λi,x is the arrival rate of tasks to the ith
queue with priorities higher than X = x. Let λx denote the arrival rate of tasks to the principal with
priorities higher than x. Then,
λi,x = λxpi =
λx
n
. (64)
Also, since µi is the unconditional service rate for the ith agent, it is the same for each agent, and is
equal to M̂n. As a result,
E[XD|R = 1] = · · · = E[XD|R = n].
Therefore, Cn becomes
Cn = E[XD|R = 1],
where
E[XD|R = 1] =
∫
x
xfX(x)dx

(
2M̂n − λxn
)
2
(
M̂n − λxn
)2 + λxn M̂2nvar (Si)
2
(
M̂n − λxn
)2 − λxn
2
(
M̂n − λxn
)
 . (65)
Taking the limit with the number of agents growing to infinity and using (61) and (65) gives
C∞ = lim
n→∞Cn =
1
2µ(y)
∣∣∣∣
y=1
. (66)
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